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Abstract Large-scale disaster events in Japan (2011), New 
Zealand (2011), Chile (2010), and China (2008) generate a 
need for understanding the dynamics of multilocation disaster 
recovery. This article uses analogs from contemporary 
economic theory to model recovery interactions over time 
and over large geographic areas. The model consists of the 
external and internal sectors and how they engage in transac-
tions during the recovery period. The concept of transaction is 
developed and its use as a policy tool explored. The concepts 
of friction and uncertainty are introduced as barriers to efficient 
and effective completion of the transactions needed for recov-
ery. Friction adds time and resource costs, while uncertainty 
slows the completion of transactions entered into by recovery 
stakeholders.
Keywords complex recovery systems, disaster policy, 
friction, multilocation recovery, recovery theory, transactions
1 Introduction
In 1755, Europe’s largest earthquake and tsunami occurred in 
Lisbon, Portugal (Paice 2008). This event was the genesis for 
the scientific field now known as seismology. In 2008, 2010, 
and 2011 seismic and tsunami events impacting scores of 
cities and towns occurred in China, Chile, New Zealand, and 
Japan. These multilocation events increased the complexity 
of designing a recovery strategy by the central governments 
that could meet the needs of a diverse set of circumstances. 
These extreme impact events have begun to shape new ways 
of conceiving recovery and require larger frameworks to 
understand recent event dynamics and to shape appropriate 
recovery policy options. This article contributes to the dia-
logue on understanding recovery complexity and develops 
new elements of recovery theory. It applies selected econo mic 
market behavior theory as an analog for understanding 
multilocation recovery complexity. The concepts examined 
include: transactions, friction, and uncertainty.
2 The Economic Analog 
Labor markets and why and how they operate was the subject 
of the 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics. The prize recognized 
three scholars and their analysis of markets with search fric-
tions (the costs—financial, labor, and production—associated 
with markets not clearing as they would under classical 
economic theory).i The Nobel award economists developed 
a framework that seeks to explain why there can be many 
people unemployed at the same time there are a large number 
of jobs offered. Their model helps explain the ways in which 
unemployment, job vacancies, and wages are affected by 
behavior, regulation, and economic policy. The model can 
also be applied to other areas of economic thinking. This 
author thinks their findings have relevance for disaster 
recovery theory. Why is this so? 
These economists found that because of “friction,” 
markets for jobs and labor do not easily clear, or reach a state 
of equilibrium. This results in not getting the right people 
offered jobs they qualify for, in places where the jobs are 
located. They discovered that matching employer needs to job 
seeker desires is not an easy process. Instead of one equilib-
rium unemployment rate for the nation, there may be many 
rates. The process of sorting out the people to the jobs, at 
varying wage rates, in different locations, does take time. 
When a job seeker and an employer agree to a course of 
action (generally called the terms of employment), they 
create a transaction. The search process is costly and 
complicated by rules of employment, as well as the effects of 
government unemployment and social support practices. The 
friction involved demonstrates that matching demand with 
supply is not a simple process. The friction itself can vary in 
intensity and scaled into units such as simple, compound, and 
complex according to subject at hand. For example, the time 
needed to verify job skills is a simple friction, just as qualify-
ing people’s losses for aid in a disaster can be classified as a 
simple friction. While policy makers (at local and national 
levels) may choose a desired unemployment target, given a 
particular level of friction, it is not easy to achieve the target 
at a given point in time.
This supports recent findings on hazard mitigation that 
few things are as simple as they first appear and that 
rationally based systems do not work well when faced with 
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complex conditions and poorly conceived policy implemen-
tation schemes (Alesch, Arendt, and Petak 2012). Context 
does matter in any analysis. The question of whose best 
interests are served always appears and adds a degree of 
uncertainty to the recovery process. By recognizing that 
friction does occur, policy to address its costs can be designed. 
If costs are very high a lower than optimum equilibrium level 
can be accepted. The friction concept can be applied to recov-
ery from major disasters because no recovery is optimum, and 
each recovery is unique in terms of context and the types of 
friction generated.
3 The Contradictions in Recovery 
Viewpoints
We are beginning to understand that there are two important 
contradictory views of recovery. The first view is that recov-
ery is not guaranteed. After nearly 100 years, Lisbon had not 
fully recovered (Paice 2008); after 17 years, Kobe, Japan still 
possesses neighborhoods in need of attention and an economy 
still less robust than before the event (Edgington 2010). What 
actually happens is that over time partial recovery works in an 
iterative manner to influence the overall set of outcomes to 
the social, economic, and built environments. The second 
view is that recovery almost always occurs as a natural 
process of impacted areas and people getting on with their 
lives (Vale and Campanella 2005). Lisbon close to 260 years 
later is a thriving city that is safer overall due to mitigation-
based land planning and improved building systems put in 
place by its Royal Crown during the first 10 years of recovery. 
These different outcomes can be thought of as a continuum 
from abandonment of the impact area with people moving 
away, to everyone returning to their previous place of 
residence, resuming the same level of livelihood and social 
relations as before the event, or achieving some overall 
betterment. 
These two different end states can be conceived as a 0–1 
continuum with 0 being the abandonment of the disaster site 
and 1 being near complete rebuilding of economic, social, 
and physical environments as previously existed. Outcomes 
closer to 0 occur when the probability of disaster reoccur-
rence or level of estimated damage and risk levels are so high 
that remaining in place becomes an unacceptable societal 
(collective) or individual choice. Some modeling of the vari-
ous components is needed to estimate parameters, which then 
can be used to make basic decisions that shape the recovery 
strategy. Then some target between 0–1 might be chosen and 
the model tested. Depending on the extent of damage to peo-
ple, the economy, and the built environment the model would 
test the target estimate (somewhere between 0 and 1). While 
not often the case, abandonment does occur. Abandonment 
was the recovery choice made for an entire Chinese city 
impacted by the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake (Chen and Booth 
2011). 
The City of Beichuan, China suffered at least 20,000 
deaths, including 400 of its local officials. The city is located 
in a deep valley with large unstable mountains on all sides. 
The magnitude 7.9 earthquake on 12 May 2008 sheared off 
parts of the mountains causing extreme landslides. In this 
case the recovery “in place” had a long-term probability of 
near to 0, if it remained there, but closer to 1 in a different 
location. 
A site 15 km south of the old city was obtained, and by 
2012 housing for 30,000 people was being built. According to 
He Wang, the city’s architect and urban planner, the qualities 
that the Chinese Premier wished to be included in the new 
Beichuan were: safety, livability, the character of the ethnic 
Qiang people, prosperity, a modern civilization, and harmony 
(NPR 2012). 
In the case of Haiti’s magnitude 7.0 earthquake in 2010, 
the large temporary camps that have existed for more than 
two years could become permanent settlements, and thus the 
previous locations where victims resided might be abandoned 
because of lack of demand and infrastructure reinvestment. In 
such a case, the outcome would be 0, or close to it, at least in 
the mid-term period (up to five years). Due to lack of funds, 
and historic circumstances of corrupt leadership, Nicaragua’s 
old capital city of Managua has remained abandoned since the 
1972 earthquake that destroyed 13 km2 of the central city. 
4 Defining the Recovery Sectors
Continuing with the labor market analogy, in the recovery 
process we can conceive of two main sectors: internal and 
external. The internal sector consists of the local people with 
their socioeconomic, and built environment event loss-based 
needs. The external sectors consist of the governmental, 
private, and donor institutions that can provide recovery 
resources and assistance. The internal and external sectors 
need information concerning internal needs and external 
capacities in order to sort out transactions, time to determine 
the location and type of transactions, and the options 
available to conduct the transactions. This is not unlike labor 
markets that need to transmit adequate information in order 
for the employment search process to sort itself out. 
The recovery process consists of the two main sectors 
attempting to conduct transactions and the friction that slows 
the implementation of transactions. In this case, friction is the 
cost (in terms of time, funds, political support, economic loss, 
and physical displacement) related to coming to agreement on 
how to “transact” (in the institutional sense) the agreements 
needed to satisfy the internal and external sector require-
ments. Friction occurs when the objectives of the subsectors 
conflict. In many cases this conflict is based on imperfect 
information flows. For example, in the Chilean recovery from 
the 27 February 2010 earthquake and tsunami, the central 
government provided 220,000 housing subsidies to replace 
damaged and destroyed houses, but required local govern-
ment to provide the building approvals to replace houses in 
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safe locations. This has slowed down the housing replace-
ment process, causing people to live up to three years in 
temporary housing. The level of friction in this example is 
determined by the time required for constructing replacement 
housing as well as a reliance on local government capacity, 
and the ability of the private construction sector to deliver a 
large number of houses throughout four different regions 
of the country, each with different capacities to respond to 
increased demand for housing. What began as a complicated 
level of friction in the first year after the disaster in 2010 has 
eased in the second year as the allocated subsidies have begun 
to be converted into permanent housing in different commu-
nities. All of this takes time, which is always in short supply 
in disaster recovery.
When the disaster event is quite large, the two main sectors 
first need to establish what are the “new conditions” under 
which recovery will take place (Alesch and Siembieda 2011). 
This may take some time, as what constitutes the new 
conditions may not be fully understood by the actors. Due to 
differentiation of conditions, larger events generate a more 
complex set of transactions needed between the sectors. The 
larger set of transactions is a function of the scale of an event 
and its impact on the areas’ economic, physical, and social 
functions. This can be seen in Japan responding to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 2011 that 
involved more than 30 cities, three prefectures, and a 
severely damaged nuclear power-plant complex in the 
Fukushima Prefecture. An example of establishing new 
conditions is the city of Ofunato in Iwate Prefecture in Japan. 
Ofunato accepts that the challenge before the city is to 
provide the conditions to keep the marine industries (fishing, 
processing, and repair) in the city and to protect it against 
future tsunamis. Physical protection of the marine industries 
subsector is the basis for designing the transaction for the new 
sea wall height to be proposed to the central government 
along with relocation of people from high danger areas. Most 
other types of transactions for recovery will stem from 
Ofunato accepting the new conditions and providing enough 
information to internal subgroups to understand them. 
The concepts of transactions and friction are shown in 
Table 1 as a matrix of elements. The transaction levels are: 
simple, compound, and complex. This set of levels is a 
starting point for classifying the transactions in the process 
at a point in time. More refined levels can be set as required 
by a particular event. The friction occurs in five categories: 
information, communication, engineering, procedure, and 
political action. The five categories represent a set of areas 
that recovery stakeholders need to address at some point in 
time. Any activity in the recovery process can be placed in the 
matrix according to its characteristics at any point in time. 
Complex activities will become complicated, and then move 
to simple activities. Complex activities will need to be 
decomposed to become new sets of complicated activities 
subject to different frictions. Any activity should move within 
the matrix over time and at some point be dropped out upon 
completion.
Policy makers, or influential actors, in both sectors may 
desire different rates and levels of recovery (for example, 
time or percentage of completion) thus causing friction 
because the expectations are not well understood and high 
levels of uncertainty exist.ii Rates of recovery are sectoral and 
can have different measurements. In the housing sector an 
international standard is to have permanent housing in place 
two years after the event if sufficient resources can be applied 
to the task (Comerio 1998). For the most part the Chinese 
Wenchuan housing recovery meets this standard, but the 
Chilean recovery did not because the delivery system is 
decentralized and relies on private sector builders to deliver 
permanent housing on sites approved by local government. 
In cities such as Minamisoma in Japan’s Fukushima 
Prefecture, located at the edge of the 20-km restricted zone, 
permanent housing will be delayed until land remediation 
is completed on sites needing radioactive decontamination. 
This will be at least a two-year process, and only then can an 
assessment on safety levels be made. The people who have 
been evacuated will not be able to return until allowed to by 
local government. 
The recovery plans for the impacted prefectures in Japan 
estimate a 3–6 year permanent housing replacement goal. 
Residents of Sendai City in Miyagi Prefecture are opposing 
the city’s request for them to leave a 1200 hectares area 
designated as hazardous and relocate under a collective 
relocation program. Residents are asking for the city to revise 
the recovery plan and construct a different set of tsunami 
counter measures. This request creates friction in the recovery 
process and a time delay to enact a permanent housing 
solution.
A number of different recovery levels are possible under 
this model as sector subcomponents (such as employment, 
education, health, shelter, infrastructure, and social support) 
may result in acceptable transaction levels separately (reach-
ing some equilibrium). Because each subcomponent takes 
a different amount of time to complete, the overall level of 
recovery may be in flux for many years. The conflicting time 
factor inherent in the behavior of sector subcomponents is 
Table 1. Transaction and friction matrix of recovery processes
Transaction Level Friction Category
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part of the overall friction concept: the sum of costs of com-
pleting a transaction (resources, time, conflicting regulation, 
leadership changes, and so on). In the recovery from the New 
York City World Trade Center 9/11 (2001) disaster there were 
repeated delays in crafting and implementing a recovery plan. 
Ten years after the terrorist attack, and with USD 20 billion 
spent, not a single completed building was in operation on the 
original site (Mammen 2011). In the case of New York City 
the actual World Trade Center site is owned by a special 
purpose government agency of the State of New York and the 
State of New Jersey. The governors of both states appoint the 
board of directors. The mayor of New York has no direct 
authority over the site. The United States Federal government 
has no direct involvement in the 9/11 recovery site except 
to supply funding provided by the United States Congress. 
Deciding how to recover and what to build was not an easy 
task. What constituted the internal sector was subject to 
change at different points in time. The 9/11 experience 
reflects many changing sector transactional requirements.
In the general model the needs of the internal sector are not 
fixed; they can change as actors adapt and learn. In large 
disaster events, some people leave, others come in to take 
their place (for short or extended periods), and the pool of 
people who become secondary victims of the event emerges. 
Therefore, the information needed for the external sector to 
supply resources to the internal sector is more dynamic than 
static. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the transactions 
adapt over time through a learning process and establish 
new requirements as information is processed and barriers to 
completing transactions are overcome. The figure illustrates 
that learning and adaptation occur as transactions are formed 
and completed. Transaction complication is an indicator that 
frictions have reached a point where action can occur. 
For example, in the Japanese system most emergency 
rules, such as no rebuilding on the same site, are in effect for 
a two-month period. But in certain cities in the 2011 Great 
East Japan Earthquake the two-month rule has been extended 
to two years. In the early period after an extreme event there 
is much uncertainty that contributes to friction and therefore 
completing transactions. As uncertainty lessens, which 
usually happens over time, the level of friction also declines. 
Uncertainty gets resolved as various internal and external 
actors make decisions and act on these decisions. For exam-
ple, in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake the placement 
and height of the Japan Rail (JR) railway stations can result in 
difference levels of safety from tsunami danger. In this case 
the railway can be considered part of the internal as well as 
the external sector. A decision on station location and height 
of tracks would require substantial agreement from the cen-
tral government on land acquisition and payments for the 
project. Such complex choices keep the level of uncertainty 
high. In the city of Sendai the decision to use debris rubble to 
elevate a major roadway close to the ocean results in a higher 
level of tsunami protection and increased levels of certainty 
about where to zone resettlement land.
A more complex transaction in the Japan case would be a 
change from the “build anywhere” practice to a “build in a 
safe area” practice (Ito and Ojima 2011). Such a change would 
require rethinking of the way the country’s economic model 
operates. Another example is that of thousands of houses 
in the city of Christchurch, New Zealand, sited on parcels 
subject to liquefaction and lateral spread. Due to the changing 
soil, building, and infrastructure conditions it took more 
than a year for a decision to be made on which of the houses 
need to be placed in the “red zone,” and which houses in the 
“orange zone” need to be abandoned and demolished. The 
“red zone” consists of locations where the land damage and 
infrastructure damage are so great that one or both could 
not be remediated or repaired in the near term and the cost 
exceeds the site and building value. The “orange zone” con-
sists of locations where the extent of land and infrastructure 
damage is serious, but final costs or remediation methods 
have not been determined. The serial earthquakes occurred 
over a nine month period and caused severe soil damage 
Figure 1. Sector transactions and adaptation over time in recovery processes
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worsening after each event and leading to rolling decisions to 
abandon the rebuilding process for at least 7000 residential 
land parcels. The uncertainty level in this remained high for a 
long time, adding to the friction between the community and 
the recovery agency. 
Just as the work of the 2010 Nobel Prize winners explain 
the ways in which unemployment and job vacancies are 
affected by regulation and economic policy, there are also 
external influences on the internal recovery process that need 
to be examined. One example of this is the withholding 
of United States Federal housing replacement funds in New 
Orleans until a different Federal agency established the base 
flood elevation (BFE) for certain flood impacted neighbor-
hoods. Delay, distrust, and a great deal of friction resulted 
from this external versus internal sector’s view of outcomes 
and needs (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). This is an example 
of the external sector (the central government) requiring tech-
nical information from one ministry (height of the base flood 
elevation) be completed before reconstruction housing funds 
be released to victims. The technical studies required months 
to complete. Internal sector actors had a need for rebuilding 
damaged houses and wanted to begin work quickly and also 
to preserve as many houses as possible from demolition and 
deterioration. The central government’s need to provide min-
imum levels of safety controlled the transaction formation 
and the process outcomes.
5 Agents and Transactions
Using the job seeker and employee seeker model, recovery 
becomes a process of completing transactions between at 
least two sectors (the set of internal agents and the external 
agents).iii The transaction is the course of action the actors 
agreed to follow.iv The unit of analysis (what we are examin-
ing) is the transaction itself. How was the course of action 
determined? When was it determined? Who was involved in 
the transactions? For example, the Chilean town of Dichato, 
destroyed by the tsunami of 27 February 2011, needed a 
buffer (or barrier) to be constructed to protect it from future 
hazard events. A transaction was made between the town 
council and the central government to expropriate 40 private 
house parcels located on the beach, and then use the land 
to create a large natural buffer zone through expansion of 
adjacent parkland. The central government provided the funds 
to acquire the parcels, and the local government supported 
this project. The people whose houses were expropriated 
were in favor of a new seawall option for protection, without 
expropriation. The seawall would have taken many years to 
build and was costly. The course of action chosen (the trans-
action) was to protect the entire town quickly but with the loss 
of 40 residential parcels. This transaction between the city, 
the central government, and the landowners was completed 
within one year of the tsunami event. 
As both the internal and external agents adapt they are 
continuously seeking to communicate and choose paths of 
actions to complete the transactions. The major sectors can 
generally divide into subsectors, such as internal agents for 
economic recovery, agents for health facilities recovery, 
agents for housing recovery, agents for land-use design recov-
ery, and so on. Larger disaster events generate larger and more 
complex subsector networks. The more subsectors there are, 
the more complexity and friction need to be incorporated in 
the transactions. Not all transactions take the same form, nor 
do they include the same sector actors. For example, reloca-
tion of the entire city of Beichuan in the Wenchuan Earth-
quake area, China, required a different set of transactions due 
to the scale and scope of the actions under way (Chen and 
Booth 2011). Here the central government found a site for 
30,000 people within the region and then established the 
mechanism for the transaction to occur. This transaction 
involved local farmers who owned the land, but needed new 
houses, the relocated population who needed to pay for the 
houses, and the government that provided the infrastructure 
required of a new town. The local farmers in this case became 
part of both sectors (actually a subset) needed to complete the 
transaction.
There is also the question of uncertainty in estimating the 
level of need in subcomponents and how to get this need met. 
Certainty is a function of belief that something will happen 
and it also provides information that can be shared. Again, 
a Nobel Prize winning economist, this time from 2002, 
provides some insight.v The prize was given for work in 
developing Prospect Theory that provided a framework to 
explain how people make decisions, particularly related 
to gains and losses. People were seen to be more risk averse 
to losses than interested in seeking gains. This leads to con-
servative behavior more influenced by intuition than reason. 
Applying this to recovery theory the greater the level of 
uncertainty that exists at any time, the greater the likelihood 
that conservative choices will be made. Under this theory 
people tend to overvalue what they have and undervalue a 
similar good they do not have. This may explain why reloca-
tion after disaster is so difficult to achieve, given people’s 
preferences to remain where they were after an event. The 
subjective value of place-based memories is real and relocat-
ing to what is considered a safer location may be discounted 
in value. This may create friction in a set of relocation trans-
actions. The resistance of Sendai, Japan residents to relocate 
from their high-hazard area is a case in point. 
The internal sector consists of all people and organizations 
(formal and informal) that have suffered loss (personal, or 
physical), or injury from the disaster event. This sector can be 
deconstructed into subsectors for purposes of information and 
aid assistance, and the means of collecting the information 
needs by subsector will differ. For example, in the Great East 
Earthquake of March 2011, many coastal community local 
government buildings were destroyed along with local 
records on residents, property titles, and so on. This resulted 
in the need for a higher level of government (the prefecture) 
becoming involved in gathering information needed to deter-
mine recovery requirements for all sector subcomponents. In 
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Iwate Prefecture, a Victims Recovery Information System 
was developed by a Japanese university and installed in the 
prefecture offices to provide a means to track victims’ needs 
and services provided by external subsector groups.vi In this 
instance the lack of a complete victim census (due to people 
swept to sea by the tsunami) created its own problems in 
the near term in knowing whom to help, resolving property 
issues, and establishing recovery service needs.
The internal sector is not static and will change its compo-
sition over time as some members reach viable recovery and 
no longer are involved in any assistance or reconstruction 
effort. Over time the sector subcomponents change in terms 
of relations with other internal subcomponents and with 
the external sector.vii The level of certainty increases as 
transactions are implemented. For example, once JR makes 
its decision on where to rebuild its stations and the elevation 
of the stations, then the choices related to where and to what 
height to install other tsunami protection measures can be 
made.
The external sector constitutes all agents providing 
resources to the internal sector. This includes government, 
donors, faith-based organizations, voluntary organizations, 
and private interests. The government component of the 
external sector has unique rights and responsibilities in this 
system. For example, even if donors wish to supply funds for 
replacement buildings, the government must decide if the 
area is safe to build and give permission to do so. The city of 
Lisbon in 2012 is much safer than Lisbon in 1755 due to the 
government’s (royal decree) action to establish a new system 
of rectilinear streets and wide major boulevards after the 
earthquake, tsunami, and fire. In Christchurch, New Zealand, 
after the 2011 earthquake an area comprising nearly 7000 
houses has been declared as non-rebuildable due to soil con-
ditions. The friction caused by this external sector decision 
(in this case the national government) will result in a complex 
set of transactions to be completed, and will result in much 
greater certainty as to where to rebuild residential areas. 
Friction can also occur between external subsectors. Various 
competing missions of national ministries for example may 
not be aligned and cause conflicting actions to occur that 
confuses the internal sector and causes increased levels of 
uncertainty. This works itself out through learning where the 
uncertainty is occurring and then adapting to the needs 
through the design of appropriate transactions.
6 Concluding Discussion
The questions emerging from this model include: (1) how 
to assemble the information on what constitutes the internal 
sector in terms of individual and collective needs and capac-
ity to utilize resources as they become available; (2) how to 
determine what constitutes the external sector relations that 
may include state government, national government, and 
donor sectors; (3) how to lower the uncertainties within 
and among these sectors that create friction and complicate 
transactions; and (4) how to estimate and lower the friction 
costs. The policy question is how to move from complex 
through complicated to simple transactions in the least amount 
of time and with the highest outcomes for invested resources 
(fiscal and human).
There are few studies that address multilocation recovery 
complexity. This will change as more becomes known 
about the Japan, New Zealand, Chile, and China experiences. 
Interest will also change as more such events occur in a more 
urbanized world.viii Multilocational recovery complexity is 
but one aspect of the more general emergence of interest 
in the sustainability of cities impacted by extreme events 
that cause catastrophic damage to life and property. This use 
of emerging economic theory rests on the belief that cross-
disciplinary approaches can yield more information to policy 
and decision makers than remaining within a single disciplin-
ary boundary. While the use of two general sectors (internal 
and external) may appear to oversimplify the complexity 
of what happens in recovery, it does allow for a greater 
understanding of general system dynamics. 
While uncertainty has risen to a high level of concern with 
the 2011 nuclear crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant in 
Japan, uncertainty is also a factor in most contemporary 
recovery efforts. We need better ways to model uncertainty 
and design ways to lower its impact and duration. 
Multilocational recovery complexity studies may also lead 
to a better understanding of a general recovery model based 
on systems theory and capacities of individual urban systems 
(the city) to achieve recovery over time (Alesch and Siem-
bieda 2011). By examining the outcomes of many cities and 
towns in different geographic space we can better understand 
why some cities do recover (reach some acceptable level of 
viability) while others are not as fortunate. This understand-
ing will inform the shaping of recovery and reconstruction 
policy.
Notes
i The 2010 Nobel Prize was awarded to Dale T. Mortensen, 
Pro fessor of Economics at Northwestern University, USA; 
Peter A. Diamond, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; 
and Christopher A. Pissarides, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, UK.
ii An example of uncertainty is the long-term danger the Tempco 
nuclear plant #1 presents to the population within a 30-km radius of 
the facility. This is the nuclear plant that suffered earthquake and 
tsunami damage and radioactive material release due to the March 
2011 events in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan.
iii External agents consist of three large groups: government, donors, 
and nonprofit organizations (NGOs and community and faith based 
organizations are included in this group). Government takes in the 
national level, prefecture or state level, and associated ministries 
and agencies. Internal agents are people in communities, their civic 
organizations, local governments, and special interests.
iv A transaction requires some degree of mutual agreement. This is 
different than mandatory requirements where no choice is given. 
Many recovery processes involve both transactions and mandatory 
actions.
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v Daniel Kahneman, Professor at Princeton University, USA, was 
awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on 
Prospect Theory, the understanding of loss aversion behavior, and 
contributions to behavioral economics.
vi Haruo Hayashi at Kyoto University created this as an information 
system tool that would be used by local governments in long-term 
recovery.
vii In Chile, the coastal towns impacted by the February 2010 earth-
quake and tsunami needed to get the local fishermen back to work 
quickly in order to restore economic sustainability. This led to more 
emphasis on meeting the fishermen’s needs than other subsector 
needs such as housing replacement.
viii Haiti could be added to this list as it fits the multiple location 
criteria and the model does apply.
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